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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
The general doctrine of set-off is very clearly set forth by
Chancellor WALWORTH in Holbrook v. .Receiver8 of Fire In8. Co.,
6 Paige 220.
In view of all the facts in this case, that the officers of the
Independent Insurance Company were purchasing these claims,
although for other parties; that it was reported to defendants they
were purchasing for the company; the fact that they were being
purchased in large numbers for 25 per cent., I think the defendants
had a right to make the purchases and that by a proper construc-
tion of the provisions of the Bankrupt Law they have the right to
set them off against the plaintiff's demand.
The defendants having failed to establish their tender, judg-
ment will be rendered for the plaintiffs for the balance of their
demand, with interest.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF MICIIIGAN.'




New Rights not to he Acquired by.-Ejectment was brought by two
for a whole tract of land; it appearing that one-twentieth was owned
by another, an amendment adding his name was proper: Kaul v. Law-
rence, 73 Pa.
Amendments should not be allowed so as to deprive the opposite party
of any right: Id.
A party will not be allowed by amendment to shift or enlarge his
ground by introducing an entirely new cause of action, especially when
by reason of the Statute of Limitations, an injury would result to the
opposite party: Id.
In ejectment a name was added as plaintiff after suit brought; upon
request, the court should charge, that if at the time of the amendment
the title of the new party was barred by the Statute of Limitations he
could not recover: Id.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Forged Endorsement -An endorsed note was discounted by a bank
for the drawer, at maturity he took it up by a similar note on which the
I Abstracts by Henry A. Chancy, Esq. ; to be reported in full in 27 or 28 Mich-
igan Rep.
2 From P. F. Smith, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 73 Pennsylvania State Rep.
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endorsements were forged, and destroyed the original note ; he took up
the second note by another note with forged endorsements. Held, that
taking the last two notes in renewal did not extinguish the original note:
Ritter v. Singmaster, 73 Pa.
The record of the protesting notary being proved to contain a true
copy of the first note, was admissible in evidence : Id.
The bank who discounted the first note was entitled to recover, on
proof of its destruction and the genuineness of the signatures : Id.
CHECK.
1layment by Bank to Wrong Person.-A check was drawn to Cook,
Barnes endorsed Cook's name without his authority and received the
money; the bank deducted the cheek from the drawer's account and
settled with him on that basis. Rield, that Cook could recover ihe
amount of tile check from the bank: Seventh National Bank v. Cook,
73 Pa.
The conduct of the bank was an acceptance and bound it as a certi-
fied cheek would : Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Taxaton.-The court cannot pronounce a tax unconstitutional on the
mere ground of injustice and inequality: Weber v. Reinhard, 73 Pa.
Assessments-Municipal Corporaton.-A water company was incor-
porated in Allentown, and authorized "to lay reasonable assessments in
the nature of water-rents on every dwelling in any street, &c., in said
city in which and as far as the water-pipes are now laid, or may-be laid,
and to collect," &c. Under an act for the purpose the city bought the
works of the company with their franchises, privileges, &c. Held, that
although these powers-might be unconstitttional when applied to the
company, they were not so when transferred to the city, a municipal
corporation: Allentown v. Henry, 73 Pa.
Authorizing the assessment to be made in streets, &c., where pipes
were laid, was not imposing a local assessment for a general benefit, but
was a local tax for a local benefit: I .
An ordinance by the city laying a tax "upon dwelling-houses not sup.
plied with hydrants," was not in accordance with the Act of Assembly,
and could not be enforced: Id.
Acts of Assembly.-An Act of Assembly must violate some prohibi-
tion of the State or Federal Constitution, expressed or clearly implied,
before it can bedeclared unconstitutional : Butler's Appeal, 73 Pa.
The legislative power of taxation may be delegated to a municipal
corporation, to be exercised within its corporate limits : Id.
The legislature may exempt classes of property as well as classes of
persons from taxation : Id.
An act authorized the councils of Wilkesbarre to impose a tax for
police purposes "on bowling-alleys, and billiard-tables, * * * and also
auctioneers or other venders of merchandise or articles by outcry, * * *
and all other places of business or amusement conducted for profit."
This did not authorize a tax on merchants, bankers, brewers, &c. : 17.
"Other places of business or amusement," should be of the character
of those specifically designated : Id.
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The ordinance of councils enacted that after notice and failure to pay
in ten days, the party should "upon conviction pay a fine not exceeding
$100, or imprisonment not exceeding thirty days or both at the discre-
tion of the mayor." This being without authority in the act could not
be enforced: Id.
CRIMINAL LAW.
Notes of Testimon.y-Dying Declarations.-On the hearing before a
justice of the peace of a prisoner charged with murder, the testimony
of a witness for the Commonwealth was taken in writing. The witness
having died, the notes of his testimony were admissible on the trial:
Brown v. Commonwealth, 73 Pa.
A man was found dead in a road about three hundred yards from his
house, with marks of violence. His wife was found in the house the
same day, with wounds of which she afterwards died, and there were
marks about the house showing that it had been robbed. Held, that the
dying declarations of the wife were not evidence for the Commonwealth
on the trial for the murder of the husband: Id.
DAMAGES.
When a vendor fails to comply with his contract, the general rule for
the measure of damages is the difference between the contract and
market price at the time of the breach: _tcHose v. Fulmer, 73 Pa.
When the article cannot be obtained in the market, the measure is the
actual loss the vendee sustains: Id.
Mlclcose, a manufacturer, contracted for iron from Fulmer, who failed
to comlily, and McHose could not supply himself in the market. HeMd,
that the measure of damage was the loss he sustained by having to use
an inferior article in his manufacture, or in not receiving the advance
on the contract price upon contracts he was to fill relying on Fulmer's
contract: Id.
.fensure of-, ale.-J. sold stock to T., and agreed that when T.
should desire it, he would take it back and repay the price. fHeld, that
upon tender of the stock T. might recover the price with interest:
Laubach v. Laubach, 73 Pa.
On a refusal by a vendee 'to accept goods sold him, the measure of
damages is the difference between the contract and the market price at
the time of refusal: Id.
Where the contract is that the vendee may rescind the contract, the
vendor to pay back the price, or the contract is rescinded by the vendee
by reason of inherent vice, the measure of damages is the price paid
and interest: Id.
EJECTMENT. See Amendment.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See Specific Performance.
MORTGAGE.
On Foreclosure the Rights of an Adverse Title cannot be adjudicated
-19ectment theproper Remedy.-This was a question as to the owner-
ship of certain mortgaged lands against which fbreclosure and sale were
decreed, but which seem to have been owned exclusively by other parties
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than the mortgagor. Nevertheless the pleadings made no issue upon
either the question of the superiority of title, or the forgery of the deed
purporting to convey the property from the alleged owner to the mort-
gagor I[ ld:
It is not competent, in a foreclosure suit, whatever the pleadings, to
proceed to litigate and settle the right of a party who sets up a legal
title, which, if valid, is adverse and paramount to the title of both
mortgagor and mortgagee : Simmons v. Enzerson et al., S. C. Mich.
Section 5154 of the Compiled Laws, declaring that the commissioner's
deed in a mortgage sale shall be an entire bar against the mortgagor and
mortgagee, does not mean to give the purchaser title by barring the true
owner: Id.
The purchaser must be left to try the hostile title in ejectment, when
a jury may pass upon the question of the forgery of the deed. Neither
court, under the above statement, can award a writ of assistance against
the holder of the hostile and alleged paramount title: Id.
31UNICIPAL COaPORATION. See Constitutional Law; Street.
Powers of-Public and Private Character and Rights of-Control
of State over.-The Park Commissioners of Detroit were appointed ,by
the State Legislature under Act 277 of 1871, but being officially recog-
nised by the common council of the city, the Supreme Court held them
to be city officers: Attorney-General v. L~throp, 24 Mich. 285. The
authority of the commission extended to the adoption of plans for a park,
the selection of a suitable park-site, and the making of conditional con-
tracts for the land, subject to the approva of the common council and
a citizens' meeting. Act 224 of 1873 abolished citizens' meetings, and
Act 214 added to the powers of the Park Commissioners by authorizing
them to "acquire by purchase" lands not exceeding $300,000 in cost,
and further declared that the common council should provide money
within certain limits to pay for such lands as the commissioners should
have purchased, and such as they should !deem necessary, but had not
been able to 'purchase. the money to be raised by the issue and sale of
city bonds. The only discretion left with the council related to the
amount of the bonds, rate of interest thereon, and time of payment.
In accordance with this act (No. 214), the commissioners, on August
13th 1872, requested the council to issue bonds not exceeding $300,000
in amount, to pay for lands they had determined on. The council re-
fused, and the park commissioners applied to the Supreme Court for a
writ of mandamus to compel them to make the desired issue under the
act, which was refued: Park Commissioners v. Common Council, S.
C. Mich.
In all matters of general concern there is no local right to act inde-
pendent of the state, and the local authorities cannot determine for
themselves whether they will contribute through taxation to the support
of the state government, or assist when called upon to suppress insur-
rections, or aid in the enforcement of police laws. On all such subjects,
the state may exercise compulsory authority, and may enforce the per-
formance of local duties either by employing local officers for the purpose,
or through agents or officers of its own appointment. See Peole v.
Mahaney, 13 Mich. 487, also, as to the doctrine that in the levy of
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taxes for general purposes, municipal bodies cannot demand a right to
be consulted, and their consent is immaterial, see Bay, Oitty v. State
T2reasurer, 23 Mich. 503. Nor have the people a discretionary authority
to'perform or not the duties which they owe to the commonwealth at
large: Park Commissioners v. Common Council, S. C. Mich.
Although municipal authorities, when used in state government, are
under state control, they have objects and purposes peculiarly local, in
which the state is legally no more concerned than in the individual and
private concerns of its several citizens. The necessity of incorporating
cities and villages most distinctly appears from a stand-point of local,
rather than of state interest. The two-fold character of municipal
organizations, on the one hand for state purposes, and on the other for
the benefit of individual corporators, has always been recognised by tile
Supreme Court of Michigan : Id.
In many states it has also been decided that a municipal corporation
may justly be held, when receiving its charter, to contract, in considera-
tion of the powers conferred, that its authorities shall perform toward
all parties concerned, the several duties imposed upon the corporation,
and may be held liable in damages for their fhilure to perform them : Id.
Municipal corporations, considered as communities endowed with
peculiar functions for the benefit of their own citizens, have always been
recognised as possessing powers and capacities, and as being entitled to
exemptions, distinct from those which they possess or can claim as con-
veniences of state government. These arc usually designated as "pri-
vate" powers, &c., in distinction from the public powers, capacities and
interests of the state, and these corporations are thus placed, in this
regard, on the footing of private corporations: d.
It is a fundamental principle in Michigan, recognised and perpetuated
by express provisions of the Constitution, that the people of every
hamlet, town and city in the state are entitled to the benefits of local self-
government; the Constitution, however, has not pointed out the precise
extent of local powers and capacities, but has left them to be determined
in each case by the legislative power of the state, from considerations
of general policy, as well as from those which pertain to local benefits
and local desires. In conferring these powers, the legislature may give
- extensive capacity to acquire and hold property, for local purposes, or it
may confine the authority within narrow bounds, and what it thus con-
fers, it may enlarge, restrict or take away at pleasure: d.
The authority of the legislature to determine" what shall be the ex-
tent of a city's capacity to acquire and hold property, is not equivalent
to, nor does it contain within itself, the authority to deprive the city of
property actually acquired by legislative permission. As to property
thus held for its own private purposes, a city is to be regarded as a con-
stituent in state government, and is entitled to the like protection in its
property rights as any natural person who is also a constituent. The
right of the state as regards such property is one of regulation, not ap-
propriation. The constitutional principle that no person shall be deprived
of property without due process of law, applies to artificial as well as to
natural persons, and to municipal corporations in their private capacity,
as well as to manufacturing and commercial corporations. And when a
merely local convenience or need is to be supplied, the state can no more
by a process of taxation, take from the individual citizen the money to
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purchase it, than it could appropriate it to the state use, if it had already
been procured. To this extent the corporate right is an exception to
the state's general power of control: id.
NAVIGABLE WATERS.
Extension of Side-Lines into the Water-Rights of Riparian Owners
-Dok-Lines.-The side-lines of certain water-lots in Bay City strike
the shore at right angles with the middle thread of the river, but at a
different angle with the shore, which curves inward somewhat and is
nearly parallel with a dock-line established by the city corporation. The
question was whether the said side-lines, as they enter the river, should
run at right angles with the thread of the stream, or at right angles with
the shore at the point of departure. The divergence between the two,
within the line permitted for docking, would be about 87 feet.
Held, that side-boundaries of water-lots are to be governed by the
course of the stream, and drawn at right angles with the central thread:
Clark v. Campau, 19 Mich. 325. Otherwise, riparian owners might
be wholly cut off from the stream and from their docking privileges, by
the crossing of boundaries in front of them. There is no distinction in
this regard between streams that are subject to easements of passage,
and those which are not: Bay City Gas Light Co. v. Industrial Hbrks,
S. C. Mich.
Any use of lands under rivers that is compatible with the full enjoy-
ment of the public easement, belongs with the upland to which it origi-
nally appertained, unless sold or granted separately so as to sever it.
Under the common law and the law of nations, the rights of riparian
owners reached to and were limited by the central thread of the stream,
unless, as was usually the case with tide-waters, they terminated at the
shore : Id.
Even the beds of navigable tide-waters are subject to the disposal of
the state laws, saving always any public rights that may exist in them.
And even in a stream not susceptible of public use, riparian owners can
seldom occupy, by erections, any large portion of its bed, except where
it is dammed : Id.
The righit of docking must not seriously impair the right of naviga-
tion, and dock-lines fixed by the city have nothing to do with the deter-
ininiation of boundaries, as the city authorities have no concern with
the ownership of property: Id.
NEGLIGENCE. See Street.
Approach of Railroad Crossing.-The approach by a public road
crossing a railroad was particularly dangerous, because the railroad from
natural and other obstructions could not be seen nor the whistle heard.
The deceased in approaching the railroad did not stop to listen, &c. ; in
crossing the railroad he was killed by the locomotive. Reld, that the
deceased was guilty of negligence and his family could not recover
damages for his death: Penna. R. R. v. Beale, 73 Pa.
The duty of the traveller to stop is more obligatory when an approach-
ing train cannot he seen, &c., than when it can: Id.
If the traveller cannot see the track by looking out from his carriage.
he should get out and lead his horse: Id.
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The failure to stop immediately before crossing a railroad track is
negligence per se, and this is for the court. The rule is unbending: Id.
RAILROAD. See Negligence.
Powers of Railroad Superintendent.-The main question was whether
the General Superintendent of a railroad company has authority by
virtue of his office, but without special authority, and in the absence
of any showing as to what powers are actually vested in him, to employ
a physician to attend an employee who has been injured by the company's
locomotive, and to bind the company thereby. CHRISTIANCY. Ch. J.,
and COOLEY, J., held that he had such authority, and GRAVES and
CAMIPBELL, JJ., that he had not: Marquette, Houghton & Ontonagon
1. R. Co. v. Taft, S. C. Mich.
RIPARIAN RIGHTS. See Navtgable Waters.
Right to Drain Lands into Streams.-A riparian owner may drain
his own lands through his own lands into an adjoining stream, and may
prevent any such interference with the natural flow of the stream, e. g.
by damming, as will injure his legal privileges: Treat v. Bates, S. 0.
Mich.
SLANDER.
'Evidence.-It is not competent in slander to prove by the opinion of the
witness, the averment that words spoken in the third person, were spoken
of the plaintiff: McCue v. Ferguson, 73 Pa.
When the words are spoken in the second person, to whom they were
addressed of a number present, is a question of fact, and if the name of
the person is not used it is necessarily dependent upon opinion : Id.
In slander the defendant put in a plea of justification and afterwards
withdrew it; on a second trial he testified that he had not said that the
words were true. The withdrawn plea of justification was not evidence
in contradiction of his statement: Id.
SPECIFIC PERFORMIANCE.
Refusal of Wfe to join in Deed.-Specific performance of an agree-
ment to sell real estate .will not be decreed against a vendor, a married
man, whose wife refuses to join in the conveyance, unless the vendee
is willing to pay the full purchase-money and accept the deed without
the wife; if not, he must resort to his action at law for damages:
Reisz's Appeal, 73 
Pa.
No abatement which can be made in the price on the ground of the
wife's right of dower, will be just to both parties without making a newcontract for them : Id.
STATUTE. See Constitutibtal Law.
STREET.
A municipal corporation has a right to raise its streets and bridge
them in order to improve their usefulness : Allentown v. Kramer, 73 Pa.
When a municipality exercises its lawful authority derived from the
state, it is not liable for collateral injuries from the exercise of its
power: Id. ,
For negligence in the construction or repair of public works (when
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repair is a duty), the corporation is responsible for special damage caused
by its negligence: Id.
TAXATION. See Constitutional Law.
YENDOR AND-PuRcIASEM. Sce S)ecic Performance.
.Th'presentatibs-Caveat .Empor-Cloud on Title.-In part payment
for a pair of colts, Bristol gave Braidwood a note and mortgage, the
latter of which he said was "as good as the wheat," and " as good as
the money to any one who did not Want to use the money, for it was
drawing 10 per cent. interest." And, on being asked, lie said there
was no mortgage ahead of it that lie knew of. About fiur days after-
ward, Braidwood, finding a prior mortgage, already foreclosed, and claim-
ig to have been defrauded by Bristol's representations, demanded the
colts back and tendered the mortgage and ithe rest of the payment, all
of which Bristol refused. Braidwood brought replevin and obtained
judgment. The value of a certain mortga-e on land being involved, it
was held error to charge that the mere proof of the existence of a prior
mortgage describing the same land, and proof of the sheriff's deed of
foreclosure, made a prini facie case that there was a prior encumbrance
upon the land and threw upon the defendant the burden of proving tjiat
it did not affect the title. The burden of proof, on- the contrary, was
upon the plaintiff throughout, to show that it did affect the title : ris-
tol v. Braildwood, S. 0. Mich.
Where one who offers a mortgage in payment, remarks on its value,
irrespective of the existence of a prior mortgage, his remarks should be
taken simply as the expression of his opinion; the vendor, if ordinarily
diligent, can judge of the value as well as the vendee, and is therefore
not relieved from the application of the principle of caveat emptor in
regard to it: Id.
The maxim caveat emptor ought not to be extended, as it has some-
times been, so as to hold that a vendor of real estate: who, for the fraud-
ulent purpose of effecting a sale, makes a positive representation of
particular facts respecting the title, which he knows or has good reason
to believe false, and which, in fact, turn out false, but which, if true,
would make the title good, cannot be held liable in an action for the
fraud; and that the vendee cannot have the right to rescind because he
might have ascertained from the records the true state of the title, but
neglected to dd so in reliance on the truth of the vendor's representation
of the fact: 11.
If one, in order to obtain the property of another, offers him a mort-
gage on land in payment therefor, and asserts to him as a fact of which
he proBisscs to have knowledge, that there is no prior mortgage, when
he knows, or has good reason to believe, the contrary, or has no good
reason to believe his own assertion, lie would be liable as for fraudulent
representation, and the other party might rescind the contract and re-
claim his property, because lie would be entitled to substantially the
thing bargained fi)r: 1.
Where a mortgage was used in payment, the statement of the vendee
that there was no prior mortgage that lie knew of, was not a fraudulent
representation, but was of a character to fairly put the vendor upon
inquiry to ascertain the fact for himself: i.
